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 1 
Sohini Kar 
Relative Indemnity: Risk, Insurance, and Kinship in Indian Microfinance 
 ‘Sir, there is someone who wants a loan.’ Surrounded by a small pile of yellow 
passbooks, Joy, the loan officer, glanced up from filling out the ledgers for the 
day’s collections.1 We were at a microfinance group meeting in Kolkata, India. Joy 
and I were seated on the lofted single bed, the only piece of furniture save the 
narrow almirah in one corner. The sole window to the room overlooked the 
entrance to the house next door. A small child clung to the window bars, 
observing the ongoing proceedings. The ‘someone’ was Krishna, a woman in her 
late 40s, her greying hair pulled into a neat bun, who stood at the entrance.  
‘Who wants the loan?’ Joy asked, quickly getting to business. ‘Me,’ Krishna 
responded. ‘And who will be your guarantor?’ he continued. ‘My jamai [son-in-
law].’ ‘Don’t you have a son?’ demanded Joy. Krishna nodded yes. ‘Why can’t he 
be your guarantor?’ he asked. She simply shook her head silently, unwilling to 
delve into the details of an absent son. The other women in the room shared 
knowing looks, aware to some extent of their neighbor’s domestic situation. 
‘Where does your daughter live?’ asked Joy. ‘Just next door,’ she responded, 
pointing to the adjoining room through the window. Another of the group 
members chimed in, ‘Sir, he [the son] doesn’t want another obligation. Why can’t 
her jamai be the guarantor if he is willing?’ Sighing, Joy thought for a second, 
finally speaking: ‘Can’t your daughter take the loan instead? It will make things 
easier with her age and guarantor.’ Krishna nodded, going off to find her daughter 
to put in the loan application.  
Bad sons, good daughters, mothers cared and uncared for; microfinance loans not 
only operate through kinship networks, but also produce new forms of 
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relationality in the service of financial profits. For Krishna, what is under scrutiny 
is not just financial, but also filial accountability. Commercial microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) in India often require women to have male kin guarantors in 
order to access loans that are ostensibly designed for women’s empowerment. 
These guarantors are typically the borrower’s husband, but it can also be an adult 
son (18 and above), brother, or if age permits, a father or father-in-law.2
 
This 
stipulation for male guarantors to access loans both binds families together and 
discloses places where they fall apart. As microfinance loans are normalized in the 
urban poor neighborhoods of Kolkata, they have brought kinship relations under 
the gaze of financial institutions. What I call ‘relations of guarantee’ do not simply 
mirror kinship as a formal structure; rather, they call upon both borrowers and 
guarantors to also continuously reflect upon and provide signs of this relationship 
as it is lived for MFIs to assess. They reveal how underlying familial relationships 
are speculated upon and transformed by the process of financialization.  
Over the past decade, commercial or for-profit microfinance has rapidly 
proliferated in India, drawing the poor into networks of financialized debt. MFIs 
offer small loans to poor women, which are repaid usually in weekly installments. 
The loans are intended to create independent women entrepreneurs who will use 
the loans for productive purposes, enabling both social and economic 
empowerment.3 In effect, by challenging the existing distribution of credit, 
microfinance promises social change. However, the loans have also enabled the 
expansion of finance to the ‘bottom billion’ of banking. These new forms of 
financial speculation are undergirded by and often reinforce existing forms of 
social structure, including kinship. Kinship and domestic life are, in other words, 
wound into the concerns of systemic risk, becoming objects and tools of financial 
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risk management.   
Anthropologists have long debated kinship, whether as a structural system or in 
terms of its everyday enactments and relations (e.g., Carsten 2004; Faubion 2001; 
Levi-Strauss 1969; Sahlins 2011; Strathern 2005). The MFI staff, in attempting to 
contain the risks of lending, also opens up kinship to similar forms of scrutiny and 
analysis. The system of guarantors seeks to manage risk by reflecting and indeed 
capitalizing on existing patriarchal kinship structures. Yet MFIs are aware of how 
borrowers live kinship in ways that might differ from normative expectations, and 
are vigilant of changes in such relations and obligations. Meanwhile, in their 
search for guarantors, borrowers themselves consider kinship in terms of 
structure and practice. Financial speculation and abstraction requires that 
borrowers and lenders both enact and concretize kinship relations as forms of 
indemnity. 
This article shows how microfinance weaves through the complex networks of 
kinship relations as women negotiate familial obligations to manage this debt, 
both in terms of its access and recovery. These negotiations include finding male 
kin guarantors as part of the loan process, as well as convincing family members 
to borrow on one’s behalf when guarantors are not readily available. Borrowers 
not only use existing familial bonds to access loans, but also actively produce new 
or fictive forms of relationality through debt. For the MFI, kinship provides a 
kind of insurance against debt default, but even this is ultimately financialized in 
life insurance policies. Life insurance, however, also demonstrates the tension and 
limits between the fiscal and relational demands of familial responsibility.  
Financial Speculation and Systemic Risk 
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Commercial or for-profit microfinance has expanded rapidly in India, supported 
both by the government’s financial inclusion policy, and growing interest in 
‘bottom of the pyramid’ finance (Prahalad 2005; cf. Elyachar 2012; Roy 2010). 
MFIs in India raise capital from a range of sources, including commercial debt, as 
well as private and public equity. For instance, in addition to having loans from 
commercial banks, DENA had investments from a European pension fund. SKS 
Microfinance (since renamed Bharat Financial Inclusion) and Equitas Holdings 
are publicly traded on the Bombay Stock Exchange. Others regularly securitize 
their loans to raise capital. MFIs in turn extend this capital in the form of small 
loans to the poor with higher interest, effectively profiting on the differential 
interest rates.4 By lending to or investing in MFIs, banks and other financial 
institutions can benefit from the profitability of ‘subprime’ markets, while 
diversifying and minimizing their own risks (cf. Krauss & Walter 2009). Access to 
these small loans, meanwhile, inserts global financial networks into poor 
households in new and increasingly direct ways.  
Financialization is the growing importance of finance as a source of profit over 
production in the global economy (Krippner 2012), and its increasing influence 
on daily life (Martin 2002). With the shift from industrial capitalism, risk and 
speculation are increasing at the heart of profit (LiPuma and Lee 2002; Sunder 
Rajan 2005). Studies in the anthropology of finance have recently focused on the 
elite spaces such as investment bankers, lawyers, and traders (e.g., Ho 2009; 
Miyazaki 2013; Riles 2011; Zaloom 2006). However, there is less on the ways in 
which the poor are enfolded into these circuits of finance and their consequences 
(cf. Elyachar 2005). Kolkata has undergone deindustrialization over the past three 
decades and has an increasingly precarious labor market (Bagchi 1998; Gooptu 
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2009). Here, in the absence and stagnation of wages, credit is not only a vital way 
for the urban poor to make ends meet, but is also an increasingly productive site 
of accumulation.  
While the rapid expansion of finance into the lives of the poor has required 
speculation on a new market, it has also been accompanied by new mechanisms 
of risk management. Speculation and risk management are two sides of the coin 
through which finance capital has entered and reshaped the lives of those at the 
margins. The growth of the financial system has influenced not just economic life, 
but also political decisions through monetary systems and everyday life through 
savings, credit, and pensions (Knorr Cetina and Preda 2005). This growth also 
poses new risks for financial catastrophe with systemic implications (cf. Beck 
2006; Roitman 2014). As commercial microfinance has grown, so have concerns 
over its impact on systemic risk, as was debated in the 2011 Microfinance Bill 
(Lok Sabha 2011). In other words, what kind of threat does the microfinance 
sector, by lending to the poor, pose to the overall financial system?    
To contain the dangers of systemic risk, the transformation of the poor as a 
profitable credit market hinges on MFIs’ ability to manage the risks of unbacked 
lending. The 2008 US Subprime Crisis, for instance, demonstrates the dangers of 
systemic crisis triggered by flawed lending practices (cf. Tett 2009). The crisis was 
triggered not just by too much risk-taking, but the bankers’ assumption that they 
had in fact overcome risk (Ho 2010). With poor borrowers being further enfolded 
into global financial networks for profit, their everyday lives are harnessed for 
managing the very risks of such lending. Ironically, these new forms of 
speculation have relied on existing and entrenching forms of structure and 
hierarchy. Domestic life, particularly kinship, is part of this calculus of risk-taking 
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and hedging. 
Within development frameworks, microfinance has been lauded as offering 
collateral-free loans to the poor who are otherwise excluded from access to 
formal finance. In reality, such unbacked lending would be too risky; rather than 
being collateral-free, material capital is substituted in microfinance with social 
capital. There are different histories and ways in which the global poor have been 
brought into global financial networks through microfinance (Kar & Schuster 
2016). In the well-known Grameen Bank model, microfinance lenders require 
women to form groups of 10-30 borrowers in order to access loans, relying on 
social rather than material collateral (cf. Schuster 2014). Known as Joint Liability 
Groups (JLGs), borrowers are held accountable for each other’s loans, thereby 
reducing the risk of lending to the poor (Hermes & Lensink 2007). Recent studies 
of microfinance have explored the problematic features of JLGs in producing 
excessive amounts of peer pressure among group members (e.g., Karim 2011; 
Lazar 2004; Rahman 1999). From the institutional side, however, there are a 
number of limitations to the JLG model. While reducing transaction costs of 
operation, JLGs slow the speed at which MFIs can grow their operations, as it 
requires ensuring members have built adequate levels of social capital before they 
can be considered reliable sources of collateral guarantee.  
As commercial microfinance has expanded in India through the auspices of the 
government’s financial inclusion plan as well as recognition of profits at the 
bottom of the pyramid, many MFIs, including DENA, have switched to a new 
system: the Individual Liability Method (ILM). Through the ILM, loans are made 
to the individual, without requiring group members to be liable for each other’s 
loans. Compared to JLGs, which may require group-training sessions, loans 
 7 
through individual liability are both faster to authorize and enable MFIs to more 
rapidly expand their outreach. On the one hand, DENA continues to utilize the 
group system for loan recovery practices. This means that borrowers must belong 
to a group and attend the weekly repayment meetings, while the overall 
creditability (i.e., access to future loans) depends on the timely repayment histories 
of all borrowers. On the other, while the MFI may use the group system to 
enforce some degree of peer pressure upon borrowers to repay loans, it does not 
hold other group members responsible monetarily for a defaulting borrower. In 
other words, there is no direct financial responsibility of group members for a 
defaulting borrower. This has required increasing levels of labour on the part of 
loan officers to ascertain the creditworthiness of borrowers (Kar 2013). Moreover, 
in the absence of both material and social capital, MFIs using the ILM must 
institute other forms of risk management. That is, the ILM is not as individualized 
as the name would suggest. One technique is to require male guarantors for loans. 
Another, as I will discuss later, is the implementation of mandatory life insurance, 
though the two are interlinked.  
This article draws on 14 months of fieldwork conducted in Kolkata between 2009 
and 2011. During this time, I worked with a non-banking financial company 
microfinance institution (NBFC-MFI)
 
that I call DENA.5 Based out of three 
different branch offices in the city, I attended borrower group meetings and 
house verifications with MFI staff. Along with borrowers, I interviewed MFI staff 
at the branch office and head office, borrowers, as well as bankers and 
policymakers. Like most large MFIs operating in India, DENA offered loans 
ranging from Rs. 5,000-20,000 (US$100-400) to be repaid in weekly installments, 
with a flat interest rate of 12 percent or around 24 percent annual effective 
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interest rate.6 Individual loans were only made to women with the requirement of 
male guarantors. 
The women borrowers, consisting largely of the urban poor, lived in 
neighborhoods close to the branch offices. The majority of borrowers I spoke to 
were Bengali Hindu of various caste backgrounds. There were also migrant (non-
Bengali) borrowers, both Hindu and Muslim, largely from the neighboring states 
of Bihar, Orissa, and some from Uttar Pradesh. In observing kinship relations, I 
examine both Bengali kinship specifically, and Indian kinship relations more 
broadly in my analysis (cf. Alvi 2007). 
Photographing Intimacy  
All microfinance borrowers are issued a small passbook to document transactions. 
Glued on the front page of every passbook is a ‘joint photo,’ or a passport-sized 
photograph of a man and a woman—the borrower and her guarantor. In most 
pictures the pair gaze back, seriously, unsmilingly (cf. Pinney 1997). These are 
‘public-use portraits’ used for purposes of identification, rather than ‘private-use 
portraits’ (Werner 2001). In one case, a prospective borrower produced, much to 
the bemusement of the loan officer and other members of the group, a full-sized 
portrait for her joint photo. She was instructed to retake the photograph in the 
appropriate passport size. As microfinance has spread, the small passport-sized 
joint photos have become normalized in India as a particular form of ‘public-use’ 
photo.  
Once a loan application is accepted, the MFI requires two copies of a joint photo: 
one is for the MFI’s files, while the other is attached to the passbook issued to the 
borrower. Borrowers bring their passbooks to the group meetings, during which 
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loan officers collect the week’s repayment to document the amount repaid and the 
amount outstanding. Rarely does the loan officer check the photo against the 
borrower. Yet as a requirement for most MFIs in India, pictures sometimes go 
missing as borrowers circulate them for applications to other MFIs. Beyond a 
slight reprimand, there is little consequence for these missing photographs. 
Moreover, as part of the loan application process, potential borrowers are 
required to provide various kinds of identification, including state-recognized 
photo identifications, such as a voter identification card or a tax identification 
card. Given these other forms of identification, why require a joint photograph?  
It was an off-hand comment from Putul, a branch manager at DENA, that 
signaled the role of the joint photograph in microfinance practices. As we entered 
the room where the meeting was being held, a man with a stack of passbooks sat 
counting the money that had been sent.7
 
At first, as was often the case, I assumed 
him to be the husband of one of the borrowers. Sitting down, Putul picked up the 
first passbook. ‘It’s not a joint photo,’ said Putul looking at the two individual 
passport-sized photos, pasted side-by-side on the front page. ‘It’s because he’s her 
brother,’ she explained to me, before turning to the man and telling him they 
would need to get a ‘joint photo’ taken. While the two individual photos provided 
photographic evidence of the borrower and her guarantor, the joint photo 
demanded something more.  
The joint photo requires that subjects are aware, not of their individuality, but 
some sense of their mutuality; of the way in which microfinance loans become 
bind together people in relationships of guarantee. In this sense, it contrasts with, 
Jean-Francois Werner’s (2001) explanation of the individual ID photo, which 
links the biographical data on the document to the person photographed. In its 
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use in the African context, Werner argues that the ID photo has also been central 
to the process of individualization. The ID photograph ‘constitute[s] the 
photographed subject into a singular entity (individuation)’ (Werner 2001: 263). 
Further, this photograph works to objectivize the photographed person’s body, 
and ‘turns out to make a subject aware of his/her own individuality’ (Werner 
2001: 263). The joint-photo, however, projects a different kind of person. Rather 
than the individual, it comes to represent the ‘dividual,’ encouraging the 
photographed to think of themselves as persons ‘constructed as the plural and 
composite site of the relationships that produced them’ (Strathern 1990: 13). The 
process of getting the photograph taken requires not just institutional or 
bureaucratic recognition, but also ‘social certification’ (Gaibazzi 2014: 40) that 
would enable borrowers to make claims upon guarantors. 
In order to get these photos taken, borrowers must go to a studio. These are 
occasions that require time, and more significantly, produce certain forms of 
intimacy. The joint photograph is less significant as a material object, than as the 
photographic encounter produced through the process. The photograph is a 
‘space of appearance in which an encounter has been recorded between human 
beings, an encounter neither concluded nor determined at the moment it was 
being photographed’ (Azioulay 2010: 252). It is this encounter that the MFI seeks 
to capture and confirm when they demand that borrowers provide joint photos; 
this moment when the borrower and her guarantor acknowledge each other in the 
intimate space and under the gaze of the photographer.  
The relationships of guarantee that are to be captured by the joint photo—despite 
the serious countenance most images portray—is that of intimacy. Whether 
between wife and husband, mother and son, or sister and brother, the photograph 
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is both produced in a space of and as a reminder of familial love (cf. Inden & 
Nicolas 2005).
 
The joint photo becomes a form of mediation, or the ‘conceptual, 
technical, and linguistic practices by which the actually irreducible particularities of 
our experience are, apparently, reduced’ (Mazzarella 2006: 476). The photograph 
serves less as proof of identity than as confirmation or evidence of the intangible 
intimacy between kin, and ultimately of obligation in this debt relationship. The 
process of getting the joint photograph taken, as well as the material object, calls 
the borrower to reflect on and reinforce the relationship of guarantee that is 
captured in the image. 
Even while capturing a unit beyond the individual, the joint photograph cuts the 
duo from other relationships in which a borrower is embedded. The photo 
documents and enforces a heteronormative and patriarchal ideal (cf. Bedford 
2005). The photograph of the borrower and her guarantor offers a static and 
idealized view of the relationship. What is constituted in the relationship between 
husband and wife, mother and son, or brother and sister, however, is often much 
more complicated set of negotiations and relations. On the one hand, the MFI 
hedges its risks on the expectations of these static relations; on the other, it also 
recognizes that these are not unchanging bonds. Rather, the domestic life and kin 
relations become objects of intense scrutiny for MFI staff in the attempt to 
manage emergent risks.  
Gendered Guarantee  
 “I don’t know how to cook or clean or do anything,” giggled Munni, a young 
Bihari woman. She wanted a loan for her business selling readymade clothes. 
Mukul, the branch manager, asked why she needed a loan if her husband had a 
salaried job. “Why shouldn’t I have loan?” Munni shot back. “Because I married 
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for love [prem kore] to a man who has a job?” she demanded. For Mukul, that 
Munni would choose to run a business when her husband and guarantor had a 
dependable salaried job was suspicious. Munni, with youthful defiance, demanded 
to know why she should be excluded from access to loans based on her husband’s 
income. Negotiations such as these framed the ways in which microfinance often 
reinforced rather than challenged gendered relations of dependence. 
While premised on women’s empowerment, the requirement by MFIs for male 
guarantors is particularly perplexing. In response to my question about why 
borrowers had to have male guarantors, Mr. Guha, the deputy general manager at 
DENA, explained: ‘We are giving loans to ladies, and almost every man is 
working. If it is a lady guarantor, then pressure will have to go to the lady. It is 
better to have a male.’ For Mr. Guha, there are two main reasons for having male 
guarantors: First, men were more likely to be employed and to have a regular 
income to ensure repayment. Second, he invokes female fragility in face of 
possibly coercive repayment pressures.  
On the first point, there was a financial imperative for the MFI to confirm that 
there would be a male source of income to finance the repayment of the loan. In a 
different conversation, a loan officer explained that the reason for having male 
guarantors was so that a husband could not later say that he did not know his wife 
was taking a loan, and forbid her from repaying it. On the second point, Mr. 
Guha acknowledges that MFIs put pressure on their borrowers to maintain high 
rates of recovery. Mr. Guha invoked a notion of feminine fragility and masculine 
resilience when faced with these pressure tactics. In practice, of course, women 
face the pressures of repayment even more acutely than their male guarantors, 
particularly during group meetings. The gendered rationality offered by Mr. Guha 
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that men are the ones to face the coercive pressures of repayment does not fully 
hold in microfinance practices.  
Studies in microfinance have attempted to examine to what extent loans stay with 
women or are captured by men (Holvoet 2005). The guarantor system did not 
challenge structural and gendered forms of domestic inequality (cf. Yanagisako 
and Collier 1987). Rather, it recognized patriarchic social structures and actually 
capitalized on it by reinforcing women’s dependence as a means of ensuring 
repayment both in terms of financial accountability and as objects of coercive 
pressure. There is an ironic tendency of microfinance to enforce or even 
strengthen prevailing gender hierarchies and structures of inequality (e.g., Karim 
2005; Rahman 1999; Rankin 2002). Similarly, through the requirement of the male 
guarantor, patriarchal norms are enfolded into lending practices as a way to 
mitigate the risk of lending to poor women. Yet there is a second dynamic that is 
also in play: Beyond the way in which the guarantor system solidifies gendered 
hierarchy, practices around seeking out and sustaining male guarantors makes and 
unmakes kinship practices and relationships in new and sometimes unexpected 
ways.  
Domestic Interruptions  
One morning, I was accompanying Anand, a branch manager, on his daily rounds 
to group meetings. We were in front of the locked house where the next meeting 
was to be held. Another borrower, Kabita, turned up as we waited, saying that 
Daisy, the woman whose house served as the MFI meeting center, had gone to 
buy fish at the market. ‘Why did she go shopping now?’ demanded Anand. ‘She 
should know to go early or after the meeting.’ ‘And you know her, she’ll take 
forever to get back; probably talking to people, and you know...’ Kabita 
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responded, rolling her eyes, before going off in search of Daisy. I asked Anand if 
there were any problems with Daisy. ‘Nothing right now,’ he said, ‘but she’s going 
through some difficulties and we’re not sure about her situation in paying off the 
loan. Her [Daisy’s] husband just left— just walked out of the house, leaving her 
and the child.’  
Kabita returned with the keys, though there was still no sign of Daisy. By this 
time, other group members had arrived and we all entered the small, one-room 
house. As we waited, Anand picked up a stuffed toy on the bed: a ‘Bal Ganesh’ 
character from the popular children’s animation based on the Hindu god. ‘These 
can be quite expensive,’ he observed. ‘How much do you think they cost? Maybe 
Rs. 300 or 400?’ he wondered. I shrugged, unknowingly. In the middle of the 
meeting, Daisy finally arrived—a plump, smiling, young woman. ‘What kind of 
fish did you buy?’ queried Anand. Daisy listed the three different kinds, and 
chatted about what she would make with the fish. Later, as we walked back to the 
branch office, Anand explained why he had asked what kind of fish she had 
bought: ‘It’s another way to understand if she has enough money or not. See, 
she’s bought three kinds of fish, so that means the situation is not yet that bad. If 
it were very bad, she would have bought maybe one; when there isn’t much 
money, people have to cut back on things, even food.’ As her domestic life fell 
apart, Daisy’s household—from children’s toys to groceries—had become an 
object of scrutiny by the MFI staff.  
The absence of Daisy's husband, who was also her guarantor, created 
uncertainties for the MFI. Knowing that her marriage was in trouble, Anand’s 
indirect forms of assessment attempted to understand its impact on her financial 
situation. Marriage in India, including West Bengal, constitutes a key point in a 
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woman's life course (cf. Fruzzetti 1982). In fact, DENA did not offer loans to 
unmarried women, unless they were over 35, the assumed age of old-maidhood. 
MFI staff explained that this was because unmarried women posed a flight risk, as 
they would likely marry out of the neighborhood. The MFI would then no longer 
be able to manage the loan repayment. By the age of 35, it was expected that an 
unmarried woman would settle in her natal home with her parents or brother, 
who could then serve as guarantor. While the requirement for marriage reinforced 
patriarchal norms in terms of woman’s life course, it also most readily produced 
the guarantor that would give access to microfinance loans: her husband.  
MFIs bound borrowers in relationships of guarantee that conformed to 
expectations of the life course: husbands and wives, unmarried sisters and 
brothers, widows and sons. Specific events in women’s lives transform relational 
forms. In India, women’s ‘connections were made, remade, and unmade at several 
critical junctures over their lives: in girlhood, marriage, widowhood, and death’ 
(Lamb 1997: 295). Women’s relational lives, however, are regularly made and 
unmade outside of the context of specific occasions. As her marital relationship 
fell apart outside of socially sanctioned life events, Daisy’s creditability in the eyes 
of the MFI also fell under scrutiny. The requirement of male guarantors for the 
MFI was not simply a one off event to be signed off on a piece of paper. The 
MFI does not assume kinship relations to be static. Just as Anand assessed Daisy’s 
householding practices, domestic life had to be attended to and closely monitored 
by the MFI in order to ensure creditworthiness.  
The requirement for a male guarantor also revealed the fractures in Krishna’s 
familial life, as noted in the opening vignette. Because sons are the traditional 
caregivers for a widowed mother in Bengali society, the absence of her son was 
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noticed. Moreover, a daughter is thought to have a ‘more fragile relationship with 
her aging parents,’ (Lamb 2000: 83) once she is married. After marriage, gifts are 
expected to flow from a woman’s natal home to her marital one (Fruzzetti 1982). 
A son-in-law is supposed to be treated with reverence and respect by his in-laws, 
though this is a more formal and distanced kind of relationship. For Krishna, the 
loan mediated a new kind of relationship with her daughter, and ultimately, her 
son-in-law. The loan would be made to her daughter with her son-in-law as 
guarantor, and she would be able to access it only informally through her 
daughter. Of course, the loan was not the only factor in shaping Krishna’s broken 
relationship with her son, and existing relationship with her daughter. Because of 
the requirement of the male guarantor, however, Krishna had to publicly 
acknowledge these shifting kin relations and domestic problems in ways that 
caused her distress.  
MFIs—as with the responses of loan officers to Daisy’s and Krishna’s 
circumstances—recognized that kinship relations were not static; women’s bonds 
with their husbands, sons, and brothers were constantly being made and unmade. 
During meetings, if a borrower’s husband’s ill health came up, loan officers would 
quickly inquire on the seriousness of it. In other cases, a husband reaching 
retirement created concern MFI staff, seeking out adult sons to replace the father 
as guarantor. MFIs thus contend with the ‘internal precariousness’ (Pinto 2011: 
380) of kinship. For Krisnha the requirement of the male guarantor made her 
simultaneously acknowledge the relationship that had fallen apart with her son, 
and to forge a new bond with her daughter and son-in-law. For MFIs, creditability 
of a borrower depended on her being able to produce evidence of stable relations 
of guarantee. In its sudden absence, as in the case of Daisy, the MFI staff 
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searched for evidence in her domestic life that she remained financially viable as a 
borrower. Unlike formal sector banking that might take into account familial 
income and guarantors at the time of lending, loan officers constantly assess the 
domestic life of borrowers for signs of turbulence where the relations of 
guarantee might come undone.  
Brothers Seeking Sisters  
MFIs typically lend only to women, premised on the notion that access to credit 
facilitates women’s empowerment. Yet implicit on this focus on women is also a 
critique of poor men. Debjani, who worked in communications section of another 
MFI, explained to me that they lent to women ‘because the behavior and 
personality of poor Indian women is focused first on responsibility toward the 
family. She cannot think about herself solely, but thinks about her children.’ After 
extolling the virtues of Indian women, Debjani continued: ‘Men, particularly of 
the ‘lower strata’ of the population, tend to booze and drink and gamble. We need 
to have proper utilization of funds.’ Against the formulation of poor responsible 
women are ‘incapable men’ (Ray & Qayum 2009: 127), or men who lack the 
financial and moral discipline necessary to ensure loan recovery. While male 
guarantors ensure income to repay the loan, women as borrowers are expected to 
ensure fiscal discipline to repay the loans. Such classed and gendered forms of 
lending can have unintended outcomes, as poor men who are excluded from 
access to microfinance programs seek out women to gain access to these loans.  
Consider, for example, the case of Abdul, a young Muslim migrant to Kolkata 
from the neighboring state of Bihar. Abdul ran a small mobile phone and grocery 
store, and was trying to get a new loan from DENA. Although he was married, 
his wife lived in a village in Bihar, and so could not attend the weekly group 
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meetings in Kolkata. Neither was there an MFI in their village. Abdul’s mother 
had agreed to get the loan, but DENA required she provide an official document 
as proof of age. Having lost her voter card, she had no state-issued photo 
identification and could only produce the police report documenting its loss, but 
had not received a replacement card yet.  
As he went back and forth with the MFI staff about who would be the potential 
borrower, Abdul asked if his younger sister could get the loan. ‘Is she married?’ 
asked Mukul, the branch manager. Abdul shook his head, ‘No.’ ‘Don’t you have 
any other sisters who are married?’ Abdul replied that he did. ‘If you can get her, 
it will be best if she [the married sister] can take the loan. Come by the office 
tomorrow afternoon,’ instructed Mukul. Reversing the practice of women finding 
brothers to be guarantors, Abdul had to find a sister who could access the loan. 
Of course, this sister would also have to manage her own relationships of debt to 
ensure that she could take a loan on behalf of her brother, and not one for her 
husband. The gendered practices of microfinance lending create complicated debt 
relationships between parents or in-laws and children, as well as between siblings.  
Ironically, Abdul actually had a loan from DENA that was just ending. He 
previously had a larger ‘business loan’ from the MFI that was repaid on a monthly 
basis with higher interest and also available to men. Due to a crisis in the 
microfinance sector, however, DENA temporarily suspended its business loan 
program.8 Given Abdul’s credit history with the business loan, the MFI staff was 
eager to keep him as a client. Consequently, DENA encouraged Abdul to seek 
out female kin through whom he could access the regular loan.  
Microfinance, despite its emphasis on empowering women, reinforces the 
dichotomy in access to credit: small loans for women, large loans for men (Rajeev 
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et al. 2011).9 
 
Microfinance programs do not cover the gap in unequal access to 
formal credit by poor women-headed households (i.e., households without an 
adult male income-earner). Similarly, for many of my informants, microfinance 
did not so much replace moneylenders as produce a new gendered structure of 
borrowing within the household. In the emerging and expanding system of 
gendered debt, poor men borrow from moneylenders and, where available, larger 
formal sector loans, while poor women borrow from MFIs. Men as guarantors 
were not simply bystanders to female borrowers; rather, they were central to the 
process of seeking out loans for the household. Moreover, the system of 
guarantors produced new forms of relationships, not just between brothers and 
sisters, or in-laws, but also in terms of fictive kin.  
Producing Fictive Kin  
While husbands and sons are the preferred guarantors by MFIs, they also accept 
other male kin, including brothers. In the absence of any male kin who will serve 
as a guarantor, women will mobilize channels of communication among friends 
and neighbors to create fictive kin (cf. Elyachar 2010). Take for instance, the case 
of Panchali. One morning, Anand had gone to conduct a ‘house verification’ for 
Panchali, who was widowed and ran a small ‘hotel,’ as roadside eateries were 
referred to in Bengali.10 She lived in a room she rented from Deepa, another 
borrower in the group.  
After returning from the verification, Anand recounted his encounter with 
Panchali to Suresh, the loan officer, and me: ‘Did you see who her [Panchali’s] 
guarantor was?’ Anand asked. When Suresh seemed a little confused with the 
question, Anand explained: ‘The loan application says it’s her brother—I think 
she’s widowed—but when I went to her house and looked carefully at the form, it 
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was actually Deepa-Didi’s11
 
brother who they were showing as her [Panchali’s] 
brother. What do you think? Should we give her the loan?’ ‘She doesn’t have any 
problems,’ replied Suresh. ‘I’m sure we’d get the money back. Her son is still 16 
so he can’t be her guarantor.’ ‘But she has no direct relation to be her guarantor...’ 
trailed Anand, wondering about the implications of having a non-kin serve as 
guarantor. To what extent would a non-kin produce the right kinds of the 
relations of guarantee? In the end, they decided that Panchali would still get a 
loan, based on her history of repayment and existing business.  
Despite being successful in her own enterprise—the ostensible goal of 
microfinance—and creditworthy in the view of the MFI staff, Panchali still had to 
seek out and produce and formalize fictive male kin, who would sign as her 
guarantor for the loan. She had to produce these relationships indirectly through 
her friend and landlady Deepa. In Panchali’s case, the MFI staff’s response 
reflects a degree of flexibility with regulations on male guarantors. Recognizing 
that she was a good client, they were willing to knowingly accept Deepa’s brother 
as her guarantor.  
I asked Nilima, a loan officer, about what women who had no male kin did to 
access loans. Nilima’s answer reflected the frequency with which and the reason 
why women would present fictive kin in the form of a brother:  
She can get a brother to be a guarantor. But you know, when a woman gets 
married, then her name is going to be different from her brother’s. So, she 
could have anyone say that he was her brother, and we wouldn’t necessarily 
know the difference. Of course, we try to tell them that they have the 
responsibility to pay back the loan if his name is on as the guarantor.  
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Women without male kin maneuver around the requirement of guarantors by 
exploiting the perceived static structure of kinship. Kinship, writes Strathern, 
‘appears where one can imagine—make an abstract image of—the relative of a 
relative, relationships between relationships. Kinship appears again where people 
make an imperative out of so doing. The imperative is logical and moral at the 
same time’ (2005: 8). With the search for male guarantors, borrowers reflect on 
the structures of Bengali kinship—that women change their name at marriage—
before mobilizing fictive kin who can fit into the categories. Neighbors and 
friends, like brothers with whom married women no longer share a name, can 
readily be called upon to act as the male guarantor.  
In practice, neighbors and friends may be more integral to a person’s life than 
their real kin (Schneider 1980). In imagining these new relations and producing 
fictive kin, there can be new kinds of moral imperatives and obligations (Weston 
1991). Studies in microfinance have noted the patron-client relationships 
developed between MFI staff and borrowers (e.g., Ito 2003; Karim 2011). 
Similarly, loan officers would sometimes ask for letters from local councilors to 
vouch for relations. Borrowers would complain about these requests; about 
having to bare the complications of kinship to powerful local government 
officials. The requirement for guarantors and the use of fictive kin can 
inadvertently insert women into patron-client relationships with men who act as 
guarantors, mediators such as Deepa who enable these linkages, or government 
officials who can vouch for them. Ironically, flexibility in Panchali’s case 
contrasted with the earlier explanations from MFI staff about the necessity of 
male guarantors: namely to ensure male heads of households knew of and were 
committed to the loan repayment.  
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In cases where women have no male kin to serve as guarantors, the requirement 
suddenly appears as arbitrary. The requirement of a male guarantor can insert 
women into gender-normative relations of dependence where there are none. 
Though the guarantor is meant to provide additional indemnity, the production of 
fictive kin in order to access the loans can flip the directions of obligation. The 
mechanism for reducing risk for the MFI can produce new kinds of social risks 
for women borrowers who must seek out men to access the microfinance loans.  
Insuring Relations 
It was the final group meeting of the day. We were in an old slum neighborhood 
in the north of the city. Houses lined the narrow slope, and the meeting was in a 
room above leather-working workshop. Labony came forward to talk to the MFI 
staff, not to repay her loan, but to inquire about insurance. Labony’s husband, had 
recently been killed in an accident. A ceiling fan had hit her husband on the head, 
cracking his skull. The recently widowed borrower needed assurance from the 
loan officers that she would not have to pay off the remainder of the loan. As 
families grieved, they simultaneously had to account for the financial losses 
encumbered by these deaths and ways to manage them. MFI practices also 
acknowledge these familial losses. Just as the lens widens to include not only the 
borrower but also the guarantor in the joint photograph, life insurance policies 
attached to loans cover guarantors, recognizing the wider social networks in 
which an individual is located.  
MFIs increasingly require borrowers to buy a mandatory life insurance policy at 
the time of getting a loan. At DENA, life insurance is a requirement for a loan. 
With higher mortality rates related to lower socio-economic status in India (Po & 
Subramanian 2011), the risk of lending to the poor is not simply that of lower 
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income, but also of higher death rates. Life insurance becomes a mechanism for 
MFIs to both take the risk of lending to the poor, while simultaneously managing 
this risk (cf. Simon & Baker 2002). Although technically a separate financial 
product, the life insurance policy is quite often tacked on as an additional fee, 
leading to a proliferation of financial products for the poor.  
At DENA, life insurance fees were charged at one percent of the total loan. The 
life insurance policy covered repayment of the loan in case of the borrower or her 
guarantor’s death. The insurance would cover the loan in case of either the 
borrower or the guarantor, reflecting the centrality of the guarantor to the loan’s 
repayment. At the time of my research, DENA’s life insurance policy was in-
house and only covered repayment of the loan, but they were in the process of 
outsourcing it to a major life insurance company as was the common practice 
with most other MFIs. Other life insurance policies attached to MFIs offered, in 
addition to coverage of repayment of the loan, a benefit to survivors. As with the 
use of guarantors, as MFIs shift from relying on group lending to more 
individualized forms of lending, insurance became another mechanism of risk 
management.  
Life insurance as a stand-alone product is meant ensure the security of one’s 
family in case of one’s death (Zelizer 1978). As a financial resource in case of 
death, life insurance can produce new kinds of relational ties between kin 
(Golomski 2015; Patel 2007). With life insurance, the indemnity offered by the 
male guarantor is no longer an abstraction. Rather, it becomes concretized and 
formalized through the policy’s coverage. Once attached to microfinance loans, 
life insurance becomes a form of collateral. In the absence of material and social 
collateral, as in the case of individual lending, MFIs use insurance to hedge against 
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the loss of life and implicitly of waged labor. By enfolding the guarantor within 
the coverage of life insurance, MFIs acknowledge not only the relationality of 
debt, but also alter the ways in which life insurance mitigates the loss of income 
within a family. There is a flipping of the logics of life insurance: life insurance as 
collateral ensures the financial security of the lending institution more than that of 
the policyholder, who is still technically the borrower.  
Even as MFIs use insurance, they also manage higher insurance costs through age 
limits to lending. The implicit rationale of these limits was to reduce the risk of 
lending to older people with higher mortality rates. The cutoff for women to get 
loans was 50, while men could serve as guarantors until the age of 60, given that 
husbands would typically be older than their wives. Older women, however, 
would often be encouraged to have sons serve as guarantors, even when their 
husband was alive, thereby lowering the mortality risks of the guarantor.  
Strategies for selecting a guarantor can have unexpected outcomes. One 
afternoon, as we sat in the branch office, Putul went over the recent files claiming 
insurance. I asked her if there were many claims. ‘Yes,’ she replied. ‘Just today, 
somebody died. It was a borrower’s husband, but her guarantor was her son, so 
she won’t be able to claim the insurance.’ On the one hand, life insurance enables 
MFIs to take the added risk of lending to the poor given higher mortality rates. 
On the other, they constantly try to minimize the risk of insurance payouts 
through age cutoffs and encouragement that borrowers get sons rather than older 
husbands to serve as guarantors. This institutional tension of both taking and 
containing risk can ultimately obfuscate the realities of borrowers’ lives, in which 
they are quite often dependent on both incomes of husbands and working-age 
sons. Moreover, given high levels of youth unemployment in West Bengal, a 
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younger son may not actually be employed. The MFI attempts to align the 
relations of guarantee in a way that minimizes insurance risk. Such practices, 
however, fail to account for the realities of familial life and household structures.  
Financial Risk and Ethical Responsibility 
While reducing the risks of lending to the poor, life insurance also overdetermines 
financial risk over ethical modes of being for borrowers. Take, for instance, the 
case of Chhabi, a pregnant borrower. Chhabi came up to Samit, the loan officer, 
at the end of one meeting to talk about closing her account, because she would 
not be able to get a new loan.
 
As she did, she turned to me and expressed her 
frustration with not being allowed to take a loan:  
I need the money right now, and I would take a loan. What is the point of 
waiting? Why should you not get loans because you are pregnant? You 
[speaking to me] have to tell them [the head office] that this is a bad rule. 
Do you think that my husband would not take responsibility if something 
happened [kicchu hole]? Of course he would continue to pay back! This is the 
time that you need money the most.  
The other borrowers nodded in agreement, and Samit made no real attempt to 
respond to her argument. Pregnant women were deemed high risk,12
 
due to 
possible complications in pregnancy, and DENA did not give new loans to 
expecting mothers.13 The point of life insurance is putatively to cover such risks, 
but DENA is careful not to overextend credit (and insurance) to people they 
deem already high risk.  
The possibility of death as a pregnancy risk is acknowledged in Chhabi’s 
statement that ‘if something happened.’ She simultaneously insists that her 
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husband would continue paying in such a case. Modernity, Lawrence Cohen has 
argued, ‘is less a matter of decoding than recoding’ (2001, 14) as new forms of 
relationality emerge through changing biomedical technologies. Yet it is not just 
biomedical technologies that recode relationships; so do financial instruments 
such as insurance. While the MFIs attempt to recode kinship in terms of the 
relations of guarantee, Chhabi emphasizes the relational bond with her husband 
who would continue to pay back the loan as the real assumption of responsibility. 
She appeals to the actual relationship with her husband that is backing the loan; it 
is the very relationality that the MFI is trying to captitalize on when it requires the 
male guarantor.  
Writing of life insurance in the United States in the Nineteenth century, Viviana 
Zelizer (1978) has argued that it was not death that became profane through the 
new financial instrument. Instead, insurance became sacred, a way for men to 
ensure a good death. Similarly, microfinance practices rework rather than override 
existing ideas of relationality. In particular, borrowers often sought out MFIs that 
offered life insurance as a way to protect their families from the possible burden 
of debt. Thus, MFIs work through practices of care in kinship to make lending to 
the poor profitable and sustainable, but increasingly through financial mechanisms 
such as life insurance.  
As it further financializes kinship relations through the use of life insurance, 
however, the MFI replaces the ethical obligations with a calculative one. The 
calculations fail to account for the precariousness of life, where pregnancy for a 
poor woman is certainly risky. In contrast, Chhabi’s retort that her husband would 
take on the responsibility of repaying the loan calls for the recognition of social 
obligations. Such moments reveal the tensions of recoding kinship through 
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finance with the prevailing ethics of kinship (cf. Bear 2015). While Chhabi seeks 
to be part of the financialized system of debt through access to microfinance, she 
also attempts to remind the MFI staff that it is a moral and relational obligation 
for her husband to repay her loan.  
Securitizing credit, securing kinship 
That families offer forms of financial security is not new or unsurprising. Access 
to commercial credit certainly reshapes familial life in complex ways creating new 
sources of obligation (Han 2011). In examining the relations of guarantee, 
however, what I show is that it is not simply that borrowers rely on their kinship 
networks for accessing credit; rather, MFIs extending credit have been just as 
entrenched in this process. Lending institutions are highly aware of the ways in 
which credit intersects with domestic life. Kinship is what backs the emergent 
financial products or debt securities. The reshaping of familial life through 
financialization is not simply an unintended outcome; rather, MFIs attempt to 
harness these relations of guarantee in the service of enfolding the poor into 
financial networks to hedge against the very risks of lending to the poor.  
Emergent forms of financial capitalism reflect a shift from industrial labor to 
lifestyle patterns as the site for the extraction of surplus value (Fish 2013). As 
MFIs extend credit to the urban poor of India, they do not speculate on potential 
wages of stagnating industrial labor. Even explicitly, the emphasis of microfinance 
is the production of entrepreneurs rather than wage earners (cf. Brown 2015). 
Despite this turn to the neoliberal individual, the ‘individual liability method’ of 
microfinance is somewhat misleadingly named. Risks are not individualized; 
rather, the MFI captures familial networks in its attempts to hedge its lending 
practices. Speculation hinges on intimacy and MFIs capitalize on extracting value 
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from borrowers’ existing domestic lives. Yet to make microfinance palatable as a 
source of financial investment, including as securities, the loans have to be backed 
by something. While the structures of kinship back these risky subprime-lending 
practices, MFIs are also vigilant of the ways in which kinship relations are enacted 
and lived in daily life.  
Familial bonds in an era of financialization are constantly made, unmade, and 
tested in the process of accessing credit. What is happening in microfinance 
reflects broader trends in global finance. For instance, recognizing extent to which 
parents have funded first-time homeowners in the United Kingdom, Barclays 
launched a ‘family springboard’ loan to enable families to invest through the 
financial institution (Pickford 2016). Similarly, while poor women have always 
accessed debt from different informal sources (Guérin 2014; Ruthven 2002), 
commercial microfinance reflects how financial institutions have come to mediate 
and capitalize on these relations.  
 
Through the requirement of guarantors, MFIs recode and capitalize on kinship by 
using it to underwrite lending practices. MFI staff must continuously monitor and 
manage these relations of guarantee, including through photographic 
documentation, and ensure their stability through attention to domestic life, and 
possible disturbances to household income, including death. At the same time, it 
forges the conditions under which new kinds of obligations between borrowers 
and their guarantors are produced. Microfinance does not ask husbands and wives 
or brothers and sisters to explicitly monetize their relationship; rather, it attempts 
to recode a good marital, filial, or sibling relationship as one produces the 
relations of guarantee.
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Notes 
1 Names have been changed for anonymity. 
2 Guarantors would have to be between 18-60. 
3 Productive refers to the use of loans for small businesses, though loans were 
often used for consumption purposes. 
4 Annual interest at commercial bank loans was around 13 percent at the time of 
fieldwork. 
5 NBFC-MFI is the central bank’s official regulatory category for commercial 
microfinance institutions.  
6 At the time of research (2010-2011), the gross loan portfolio was Rs. 1.58 billion 
(around US$22 million). 
7 Despite claims to build social capital during meetings, borrowers would often 
send their money with someone to the meeting. 
8 Between 2010 and 2011, a crisis in the Indian microfinance sector led to a credit 
crunch as banks and investors withheld capital from commercial microfinance 
amid regulatory uncertainty (cf. Mader 2013).  
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9 Women-headed households in India do not get equal access to regular forms of 
credit, and tend to pay higher interest for informal sector loans. Microfinance, 
meanwhile, tends to be limited in size and frequency (Rajeev et al 2011: 79). 
10 When a borrower requests a new loan, the MFI conducts a house verification 
process in two steps. First, the loan officer fills out the application form in the 
house of the borrower. Second, the branch manager visits the borrower’s house 
verifies the information. 
11 Didi is Bengali honorific for elder sister, and MFI staff used it to refer women 
borrowers regardless of age. 
12 The problematic formulation of pregnant women as high risk is not unique to 
Indian microfinance. For instance, health insurance companies in the United 
States earlier deemed pregnancy, previous c-sections, survival of domestic abuse, 
or receiving treatment for sexual assault to be a ‘pre-existing condition’ for 
women, and effectively charged higher premiums based on gender (National 
Women’s Law Center 2009). 
13 Women who became pregnant during the course of a loan were expected to 
continue to repay, while pregnant women would not be eligible for a new loan.  
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